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United States v. Esquenazi: Injecting 
Clarity or Confusion into the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 
Amy Lynn Soto* 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted 
in 1977 to criminalize the bribing of foreign officials in or-
der to obtain or retain business. In recent years, there has 
been an increase in bribery investigations and prosecutions 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). This increase in enforcement co-
exists with an ambiguity regarding the scope of the FCPA.  
The scope of the FCPA hinges on the determination of 
who is a foreign official. The FCPA defines a foreign official 
as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a pub-
lic international organization, or any person acting in an of-
ficial capacity for or on behalf of any such government or 
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf 
of any such public international organization.” However, 
the word “instrumentality” is undefined. Consequently, the 
DOJ and SEC have taken great liberties in interpreting the 
FCPA and expanding its scope. 
In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit became the first appellate 
court in the United States to define the ambiguous term in 
United States v. Esquenazi. Unfortunately, instead of clari-
fying the issue, the court defined an instrumentality as “an 
entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that 
performs a function the controlling government treats as its 
own.” In addition, the court proffered a two-prong test with 
nine non-dispositive factors and no guidance on how the fac-
tors should be applied. 
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This note argues that the court’s approach has broad-
ened the scope of the FCPA beyond Congress’ intent and has 
resulted in a great deal of uncertainty in interpreting the 
statute. As a result of the lack of guidance, individuals and 
corporations engaging in international business are operat-
ing in a largely uncertain world. This uncertainty inevitably 
yields a chilling effect on international business. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that over $1,000,000,000,000 per year is ex-
changed in bribe payments paid in rich and developing countries.1 
This equates to over $273,000 per day and over $11,000 per hour 
paid in bribes. As shocking as it may be, this estimate is exclusive 
of the embezzlement of public funds or theft of public assets.2 Given 
the increase in globalization and pervasiveness of corruption around 
the globe, many countries have enacted anti-corruption legislation 
to combat the ills of bribery—including the United States. 
In 1977, the United States Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) in an effort to remedy the corruption stem-
ming from American individuals and businesses overseas.3 The 
FCPA essentially criminalizes the bribing of foreign government of-
ficials by American citizens, permanent residents, businesses (both 
private and public), and certain non-American individuals and enti-
ties in order to obtain or retain business; in other words, the FCPA 
set the lofty goal of eliminating “pay to play” practices overseas by 
persons with the requisite American nexus. However, the FCPA is 
rather aspirational and casts a wide net of enforcement. So wide a 
net, in fact, that it borders on being, or is simply in certain instances, 
so vague as to be constitutionally defective in its application to cer-
tain situations that are increasingly prevalent overseas. 
A crucial question requiring an answer prior to the application 
of the FCPA to a specific situation is who exactly is a foreign offi-
cial? That is the question that individuals and professionals engag-
ing in international business have been asking themselves for years. 
The FCPA does not proscribe payments made to employees of a 
                                                                                                             
 1 The Costs of Corruption, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190
187%7EmenuPK:34457%7Ep-
agePK:34370%7EpiPK:34424%7EtheSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited May 1, 
2016). 
 2 See id. 
 3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff, 78m(b), (d)(1), 
(g)-(h) (2006 & Supp. 2010), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amend-
ment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 
§§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Compe-
tition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 
§§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)). 
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commercial enterprise, but it is also silent as to whether employees 
of a state-owned or state-controlled business entity constitute for-
eign officials. 
The FCPA defines a foreign official as 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or 
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, 
or of a public international organization, or any per-
son acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of 
any such government or department, agency, or in-
strumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public 
international organization.4 
At first blush, the statute seems to have a rather broad scope. 
Further, combing through the various components of the Act shows 
that the word “instrumentality” is not defined at all. 
The ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have taken the liberty to enforce the statute as they see fit. 
The DOJ and SEC have upped the ante in intensifying their focus on 
enforcement. Because most prosecutions settle due to the high 
stakes and risk of a potentially lengthy incarceration, courts rarely 
have the chance to hear cases pertaining to the FCPA, and as such, 
the statute has avoided judicial scrutiny for the most part. This judi-
cial vacuum has allowed the DOJ and SEC to administratively de-
fine the scope of the FCPA. The Eleventh Circuit, the first appellate 
court to address the issue, had the opportunity to remedy the vague-
ness associated with the scope of the FCPA; however, it failed to do 
so. 5 
The court had the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity hovering 
over the definition of a foreign official in United States v. Es-
quenazi.6 Instead, the court punted and did not provide a framework 
to determine what an “instrumentality” means under the auspices of 
the FCPA and thus, failed to clarify for once and for all who is a 
                                                                                                             
 4 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
 5 United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 6 Id. 
SUMMER 2016] UNITED STATES V. ESQUENAZI 387 
 
foreign official.7 Rather, it proffered two tests with nine non-dispos-
itive factors to help determine whether an entity is an instrumentality 
under the FCPA.8 
The nine factors fail to provide any concrete guidance on an is-
sue of fact that ought to be considered a matter of law. Under the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision, just about any set of facts or circum-
stances would result in a foreign government being deemed in “con-
trol” of a commercial enterprise, and thus, such an enterprise would 
be deemed to be an  “instrumentality” of the foreign government. 
While there are a number of entities that do, indeed, possess varying 
degrees of governmental control, the Congress that enacted and 
amended the FCPA did not intend that some, and not total, control 
of a business enterprise by a foreign government would render the 
enterprise an “instrumentality” under the FCPA, as the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has effectively decided in Esquenazi. The only way to properly 
give effect to Congress’ intent is to abandon Esquenazi. 
This note will address the FCPA and the practical implications 
of Esquenazi on compliance. The note will begin by providing the 
historical basis for the enactment of the FCPA, followed by an ex-
planation of the existence of a judicial vacuum of interpretation of 
the FCPA and an examination of the limited case law on the “instru-
mentality” component of the federal statute. The note will respect-
fully discuss how, in the author’s opinion, the Eleventh Circuit erred 
under an analysis of the text, legislative history, and ultimate pur-
pose of the FCPA. The note will conclude with a discussion of the 
potentially deleterious effect of the broadened interpretation of the 
FCPA under Esquenazi and what Congress, or the courts, can do to 
remedy what may very well be an unintended interpretation of the 
FCPA. 
                                                                                                             
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. History 
The FCPA was enacted as a result of the political and corporate 
abuses revealed by the Watergate scandal.9 The Watergate investi-
gations revealed that American corporations had used slush funds to 
make illegal contributions to political campaigns.10 The SEC initi-
ated a broad investigation of corporate business practices, which ul-
timately revealed that over 400 American companies admitted to 
making improper payments abroad.11 The companies included over 
117 Fortune 500 companies, and it was estimated that more than 
$300 million had been paid in bribes to foreign officials.12 The 
American public and the international community were outraged. 
American legislators believed that the payment of bribes to in-
fluence the acts of foreign government officials was not only uneth-
ical but also threatened American businesses and created foreign 
policy concerns.13 Senator William Proxmire said, “Bribery under-
mines fair competition between American firms. Price and quality 
no longer control the market. The growth, profitability and employ-
ment levels of firms operating in such circumstances are dis-
torted.”14 It was also argued that the payment of bribes placed the 
United States in a precarious foreign policy position. Bribery pay-
ments embarrassed friendly governments and damaged America’s 
public image.15 In a particularly egregious example, Lockheed Cor-
poration paid Japan’s Prime Minister $1.8 million to secure a con-
tract for the sale of aircraft and, ultimately, resulted in the Prime 
Minister’s arrest and conviction for securities fraud.16 
                                                                                                             
 9 Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: 
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 
499 (2011). 
 10 See William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral 
Enforcement, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 360, 380 (2013) (discussing the his-
tory and events leading up to the enactment of the FCPA). 
 11 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 499-500. 
 12 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (Comm. Rep). 
 13 See id. at 4-5. 
 14 GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 60 (1982). 
 15 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, supra note 12, at 5. 
 16 Magnuson, supra note 10, at 380. 
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Given the public outcry and threat to America’s foreign policy 
position, the federal government was under intense pressure to take 
action in an effort to restore America’s public image abroad and its 
relations with other nations.17 On December 19, 1977, President 
Jimmy Carter signed the FCPA, after it was approved by the Senate 
in a voice vote and passed unanimously by the House of Represent-
atives.18 The FCPA would serve as a warning sign to American busi-
nesses and the international community that the United States would 
not tolerate corrupt practices by its corporations. 
B. The Statute 
The purpose of enacting the FCPA was to criminalize the pay-
ment of bribes to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain busi-
ness. The FCPA is part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
it is both a civil statute and a criminal statute.19 As such, the DOJ 
and SEC have enforcement authority.20 The statute addresses for-
eign corruption through two means: (1) the anti-bribery provisions 
and (2) the accounting provisions.21 
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The anti-bribery provisions apply to three categories of persons 
and entities: (1) “issuers”;22 (2) “any domestic concern,” which in-
cludes citizens, nationals, or residents of the United States and busi-
ness entities, including corporations, organized in the United States 
or having their principal places of business in the United States;23 
and (3) “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns,” including 
the officers, directors, employees or agents, acting on behalf of an 
issuer, domestic concern, or person.24 
                                                                                                             
 17 GREANIAS, supra note 14, at 59. 
 18 Id. at 63. 
 19 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of 
Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 395 (2010). 
 20 Id. at 395. 
 21 DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 10 (2012), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 22 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
 23 Id. § 78dd-2. 
 24 Id. § 78dd-3. 
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The anti-bribery provisions prohibit a domestic concern “from 
mak[ing] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce corruptly in furtherance” of a bribe “to any foreign 
official” for the purpose of “influencing any act or decision of such 
official in his official capacity . . . in order to assist such domestic 
concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to any person . . . .”25 
The FCPA applies only to payments intended to influence a for-
eign official to use their position to obtain or retain business.26 This 
business purpose test includes the payment of bribes to win a con-
tract, influence the procurement process, gain access to non-public 
bid tender information, etc.27 To violate the FCPA, the act of bribery 
must be made with an intent or desire to wrongly influence the re-
cipient.28 Because the FCPA focuses on the intent, there is no re-
quirement that the corrupt act succeed in its purpose or that the for-
eign official solicit the bribe in order to be held criminally liable.29 
For an individual defendant, criminal liability attaches only if he or 
she acted “willfully,” with a bad purpose, and with knowledge that 
the conduct was unlawful.30 
The FCPA, however, permits three types of payments to foreign 
officials: (1) facilitating, or grease, payments; (2) lawful payments 
under the laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country; and 
(3) promotional expenses.31 
Facilitating payments do not come within the ambit of the FCPA 
if made to a foreign official for the purpose of facilitating or expe-
diting the performance of a routine government action.32 However, 
routine government action excludes the decision of awarding new 
                                                                                                             
 25 Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(a)(1) (for domestic concerns); 
id. § 78dd-3(a)(1) (for persons other that issuers or domestic concerns). 
 26 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 12. 
 27 See id. at 13. 
 28 Id. at 14. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. (noting that the government need not prove that the defendant was 
aware and had knowledge of the FCPA). 
 31 Jared Chaykin, Note, U.S. v. Aguilar and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Sending an S.O.S. to Congress, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 63, 65 
(2012). 
 32 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b). 
SUMMER 2016] UNITED STATES V. ESQUENAZI 391 
 
business or continued business with a party.33 Examples of routine 
governmental action include obtaining permits or licenses, pro-
cessing governmental papers, or providing police protection.34 
Payments that are legal in the foreign official’s country may be 
allowed. In using the affirmative defense that a payment is lawful in 
the foreign country, it must be established that the law or regulation 
is written—it is not enough to show that bribes are not prosecuted 
under local law.35 
Promotional expenses may also be paid for reasonable and bona 
fide expenditures on behalf of a foreign official made for the pur-
pose of promoting, demonstrating, or explaining products or ser-
vices.36 Bona fide expenditures may include travel and lodging ex-
penses for an official’s visit to company facilities, training, etc.37 
However, promotional expenses do not include expenses for trips 
that are primarily for personal entertainment purposes, and family 
members and spouses cannot attend any of the trips for free.38 
Bribes come in many forms. A bribe may be disguised as a “con-
sulting fee,” an internship opportunity for a child in college, or a trip 
primarily for touristic purposes. The FCPA does not have a de min-
imis threshold because what may be a modest payment in the United 
States might be a more substantial gift in a foreign country.39 Re-
gardless of the size of the gift, the influencing party must have the 
corrupt intent to influence the foreign official.40 This protects the 
person making the gift from liability for providing items of nominal 
value or small tokens of esteem or gratitude.41 
                                                                                                             
 33 Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B). 
 34 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 25. 
 35 Id. at 23. 
 36 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2)(A). 
 37 FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Dep’t of Justice Sep. 11, 2007); FCPA Op. Re-
lease 07-01 (Dep’t of Justice Jul. 24, 2007); FCPA Op. Release 04-01 (Dep’t of 
Justice Jan. 6, 2004); RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 24. 
 38 See generally FCPA Op. Release 07-02 (Dep’t of Justice Sep. 11, 2007); 
FCPA Op. Release 07-01 (Dep’t of Justice Jul. 24, 2007). 
 39 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 15. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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2. Accounting Provisions 
Congress enacted the FCPA’s accounting provisions as an addi-
tional layer of protection against bribery because American compa-
nies are able to conceal most of their illicit bribes in their corporate 
books.42 The FCPA’s accounting provisions apply to every issuer 
under the Exchange Act that has a class of securities registered pur-
suant to Section 12 or that is required to file periodic reports pursu-
ant to Section 15(d).43 These provisions apply to any issuer that 
trades in a national securities exchange in the United States; how-
ever, they do not apply to private companies.44 The accounting pro-
visions have two components: the record keeping requirement45 and 
the internal controls requirement.46 
The record keeping element requires all issuers to “make and 
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, ac-
curately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the issuer . . . .”47 Under the record-keeping requirement, 
liability would attach, even if all the elements of the anti-bribery 
provisions were not met, if improper payments are not accurately 
recorded.48 Bribes are often mischaracterized as commissions or 
royalties, consulting fees, travel and entertainment expenses, write-
offs, etc.49 As such, the record keeping requirement serves three pur-
poses: it (1) ensures that illegal transactions are recorded; (2) pre-
vents the falsification of records to conceal illegal transactions; and 
(3) promotes the proper characterization of transactions.50 
The internal control element requires that issuers 
                                                                                                             
 42 See Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605, 610 n.16 (2007) (discussing the accounting and anti-brib-
ery provisions of the FCPA as well as the penalties for their violations). 
 43 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 42-43. 
 44 Id. 
 45 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 46 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 47 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A). 
 48 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 39. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Bartle et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265, 
1270-71 (2014) (examining the elements of the accounting provisions). 
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[D]evise and maintain a system of internal account-
ing controls sufficient to provide reasonable assur-
ances that transactions are executed in accordance 
with management’s general or specific authorization; 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit 
preparation of financial statements in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles . . . 
and to maintain accountability for assets . . . .51 
The FCPA does not specify what controls a company must im-
plement, and this allows for the flexibility to develop controls that 
are appropriate to the company’s needs and circumstances.52 Inter-
nal controls may include the tone set by management regarding eth-
ics, risk assessments, control measures that cover policies and pro-
cedures, and monitoring.53 
C. Judicial Interpretation 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its internal investigations require-
ment have resulted in an increase in the number of FCPA violations 
that have been discovered.54 In addition, the DOJ and SEC have in-
creased the number of individuals prosecuted under the FCPA and 
held corporate officers accountable in an effort to deter foreign brib-
ery.55 Mark Mendelsohn, the DOJ’s chief FCPA prosecutor stated, 
The number of individual prosecutions has risen – 
and that’s not an accident. That is quite intentional 
on the part of the Department. It is our view that to 
have a credible deterrent effect, people have to go to 
                                                                                                             
 51 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 52 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 21, at 40. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Chaykin, supra note 31, at 67. 
 55 Id.; Koehler, supra note 19, at 404 (noting that the DOJ, operating under 
the belief that an individual who loses his or her liberty is a far greater deterrent 
than a corporation paying a hefty fine, has made the prosecution of individual 
FCPA violators the cornerstone of its enforcement strategy). 
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jail. People have to be prosecuted where appropriate. 
This is a federal crime. This is not fun and games.56 
Critics of the FCPA contend that the Act is vague and too wide 
in scope.57 Arguably, the greatest source of contention is determin-
ing who constitutes a “foreign official.” The difficulty in identifying 
a “foreign official” stems from the fact that it requires defining the 
term “instrumentality.” Although the FCPA defines the term “public 
international organization,”58 it does not contain a definition for “in-
strumentality.” In the absence of a definition, the DOJ and SEC have 
interpreted the term “foreign official” broadly to include not only 
government officials and agents but also employees of foreign state-
owned or controlled corporations.59 The DOJ and SEC have deemed 
such individuals, regardless of rank or title or classification under 
the local foreign law, to be “foreign officials” because their employ-
ers are an “instrumentality” of a foreign government and irrespec-
tive of the fact that the employer is a company with publicly traded 
stock or has characteristics of a private enterprise.60 This element 
singlehandedly determines the scope of enforcement of the statute. 
In light of the increase in enforcement of the FCPA, individuals 
and corporations argue that there is a lack of guidance from the 
agencies and the courts.61 The DOJ has generally been reluctant to 
issue advisory opinions, and since 1993, it has only issued thirty-
eight advisory opinions concerning the FCPA.62 The lack of guid-
ance is compounded further by the fact that courts have played a 
minimal role in interpreting the FCPA.63 The dearth of case law is 
rooted in the fact that every large entity that has faced FCPA pro-
ceedings has entered into a settlement agreement with the govern-
ment to include non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution 
                                                                                                             
 56 Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA Isn’t Fun and Games, THE FCPA BLOG 
(Sept. 16, 2008, 7:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/9/16/the-fcpa-
isnt-fun-and-games.html. 
 57 Chaykin, supra note 31, at 68. 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(B). 
 59 Bartle, supra note 50, at 1280; Koehler, supra note 19, at 391. 
 60 Koehler, supra note 19, at 391-92. 
 61 Chaykin, supra note 31, at 69. 
 62 See Opinion Procedure Releases, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last updated June 17, 2015). 
 63 Chaykin, supra note 31, at 70. 
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agreements, and other settlements that are not subject to scrutiny by 
the judiciary.64 For obvious reasons, a business would rather pay 
substantial fees than face the negative consequences that it could 
encounter upon losing a FCPA challenge.65 As a result, the courts 
have rarely been given the opportunity to interpret the FCPA, and 
the DOJ and SEC have been given carte blanche to define its scope 
and enforce at will.66 
The increase in individual prosecutions has yielded a variety of, 
albeit a few, statutory interpretation arguments to determine whether 
a state owned or controlled entity is an instrumentality under the 
FCPA. Such arguments have attempted to discern the FCPA’s 
meaning of an “instrumentality” through the statutory text, legisla-
tive history, and the purpose of the statute. 
In United States v. Nguyen, four individuals and a company, 
Nexus Technologies, Inc., were charged with bribing various Viet-
namese government officials in exchange for contracts to supply 
government agencies with equipment and technology.67 Over the 
course of the scheme, the defendants paid upwards of $150,000 in 
bribes to Vietnamese officials.68 The defendants negotiated con-
tracts and bribes with the officials of the Vietnamese government, 
negotiated with vendors in the United States, and arranged for the 
transfer of funds for a wide variety of equipment and technology—
including underwater mapping equipment, bomb containment 
equipment, and helicopter parts.69 
In United States v. Carson, the DOJ charged six executives with 
conspiracy to secure contracts by paying bribes to officials of for-
                                                                                                             
 64 Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Peti-
tioners at 4, United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-
189). 
 65 Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and the Independence Institute as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 
912 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-189). 
 66 See id. 
 67 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Philadelphia Export Company and Em-
ployees Indicted for Paying Bribes to Foreign Officials (Sept. 5, 2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-crm-782.html. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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eign state-owned energy companies as well as officers and employ-
ees of foreign and domestic private companies.70 From 2003 through 
2007, the defendants paid $4.9 million in bribes to officials of for-
eign state-owned corporations.71 The payments were made to offi-
cials of state-owned entities in China, Malaysia, Korea, and the 
United Arab Emirates in the form of lavish vacations, tuition pay-
ments, and expensive gifts for the purpose of securing business.72 
In United States v. Aguilar, the defendants were indicted for 
their roles in a conspiracy to pay bribes to Mexican government of-
ficials at the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), a state-owned 
utility company.73 Angela and Enrique Aguilar were hired by Lind-
sey Manufacturing Company to be sales representatives in Mexico; 
in compensation, the company would allegedly pay a 30 percent 
commission based on the revenue realized as a result of its contracts 
with CFE.74 As part of the agreement, the government alleged that 
all or part of the commission would be used to pay bribes to CFE 
officials in exchange for awarding Lindsey Manufacturing con-
tracts.75 In an interesting turn of events, in December 2011, after a 
jury trial that resulted in the conviction of the defendants, the Hon-
orable A. Howard Matz granted the defense’s motion to vacate the 
defendants’ convictions and dismissed the indictment on the 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.76 
                                                                                                             
 70 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Six Former Executives of California Valve 
Company Charged in $46 Million Foreign Bribery Conspiracy (Apr. 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-former-executives-california-
valve-company-charged-46-million-foreign-bribery-conspiracy. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Indictment at 6-7, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-0077 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2013/05/06/04-08-09carson-indict.pdf. 
 73 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Intermediaries Indicted for Their Al-
leged Participation in Scheme To Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility 
in Mexico (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-inter-
mediaries-indicted-their-alleged-participation-scheme-bribe-officials-state-
owned. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Aguilar, No. CR 10-
01031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/06/25/2011-12-01-agui-
lare-order-granting-motion-to-dismiss.pdf. 
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1. Textual Arguments and Analysis 
In its motion to dismiss, the defense in Carson argued that in the 
absence of an express definition, the court must give the word its 
ordinary meaning.77 Arguing that a dictionary definition of “instru-
mentality” does not help to ascertain the word’s ordinary meaning, 
the court must consider the word as it is used in the statute.78 In do-
ing so, the defense concluded that the term “instrumentality” does 
not include state-owned enterprises; instead, the term includes gov-
ernmental units and subdivisions like boards, commissions, and 
other similar governmental entities.79 
In Aguilar, the defendants contended in their motion to dismiss 
that under the two canons of construction—noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis—an instrumentality of the government is an entity 
used by the government to set forth and administer public policy or 
exercise political authority.80 Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, 
words are to be judged by their context and words in a series are to 
be understood by neighboring words in the series.81 Under ejusdem 
generis, general words that follow specific words are to be construed 
to embrace objects that are similar to those objects enumerated by 
the preceding specific words82 As such, the defendants argued that 
the term “instrumentality” was limited to the characteristics of a “de-
partment” or “agency.”83 
In addition, the Carson defendants argued that where Congress 
has intended the term “instrumentality” to include state-owned en-
terprises, it has explicitly done so and required substantial or major-
ity ownership.84 For example, in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
                                                                                                             
 77 Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through 
Ten of the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof 
at 11, Carson, No. SACR 09-0077 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Carson 
Motion to Dismiss]. 
 78 Id. at 11-12. 
 79 Id. at 2, 12. 
 80 Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the First Superseding 
Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; [Proposed] Order (Filed Un-
der Separate Cover) at 8-9, Aguilar, No. CR 10-01031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
28, 2011) [hereinafter Aguilar Motion to Dismiss]. 
 81 United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 9. 
 84 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 30. 
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Act (FSIA), “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state means any 
entity . . . which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”85 In the 
Economic Espionage Act, “the term ‘foreign instrumentality’ means 
any agency, bureau, ministry, component, institution, association, or 
any legal commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm, 
or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, com-
manded, managed, or dominated by a foreign government.”86 
In Nguyen, the defense argued in its motion to dismiss that if the 
anti-bribery provisions were to apply to certain entities by virtue of 
government control, the requirement would have been included as 
an explicit criterion—as is included in the accounting provision.87 
The defendants contended that the accounting provision of the 
FCPA includes a criterion to determine the concept of control and 
liability for corporate owners.88 Under the accounting provision, 
“where an issuer . . . holds 50 per centum or less of the voting power 
with respect to a domestic or foreign firm, . . . the issuer [shall] pro-
ceed in good faith to use its influence to cause such domestic or for-
eign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls.”89 While there is an explicit control element in the account-
ing provision, no such control element exists for the anti-bribery 
provision. Consequently, the existence of an explicit control element 
in the accounting provision is indicative of the fact that the FCPA is 
to apply to certain foreign entities by virtue of governmental con-
trol.90 
2. Congressional Intent Arguments and Analysis 
In Carson, the defendants argued that Congress did not intend to 
enact statutory language that it had previously rejected.91 In 1976, 
                                                                                                             
 85 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012). 
 86 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 31; 18 U.S.C. § 1839. 
 87 Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal 
Offense and for Vagueness at 16, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Nguyen Motion to Dismiss]. 
 88 Id. 
 89 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). 
 90 Nguyen Motion to Dismiss, supra note 87, at 16. 
 91 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 27. 
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S. 3741 was introduced in the Senate by Senator Warren Magnuson 
and H.R. 15149 was introduced in the House by Representative Har-
ley Staggers to address foreign corporate payments.92 In each bill, 
“foreign government” was defined to include, among other things, 
“a corporation or other legal entity established or owned by, and 
subject to control by, a foreign government.”93 The American Bar 
Association advised Representative John Murphy, Chairman of the 
House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, who 
was holding hearings on S. 3741 and H.R. 15149, that the portion of 
the “foreign government” definition referring to “a corporation or 
other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control by, 
a foreign government” was ambiguous and suggested a more precise 
alternative: “a legal entity which a foreign government owns or con-
trols as though an owner.”94 
Further, in 1977, Representative Frederick Rooney introduced 
H.R. 7543.95 Similarly, “foreign government” was defined to in-
clude “a corporation or other legal entity established, owned, or sub-
ject to managerial control by a foreign government.”96 In 1977, Con-
gress passed S. 305, the bill that ultimately became the FCPA.97 S. 
305 did not include a definition that included mention of state-
owned enterprises, and by extension, Congress did not intend sub 
silentio to enact statutory language that it had discarded earlier in 
favor of other language.98 
In Nguyen and Aguilar, the defendants argued that Congress 
amended the FCPA in 1998 to bring it into compliance with the Or-
                                                                                                             
 92 Id. at 26; Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of De-
fendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at 53, 
United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-0077 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Koehler Declaration]; S. 3741, 94th Cong. § 2(e) (1976); H.R. 15149, 94th 
Cong. §§ 2(e) & (h) (1976). 
 93 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 26; Koehler Declaration, su-
pra note 92, at 6. 
 94 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 27; Koehler Declaration, su-
pra note 92, at 59-60. 
 95 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 26; Koehler Declaration, su-
pra note 92, at 79. 
 96 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 26-27; Koehler Declaration, 
supra note 92, at 79. 
 97 Carson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 77, at 27. 
 98 Id. 
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ganization for Economic Co-Operation Development (OECD) Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions.99 The Convention defines a “foreign public 
official” as 
any person holding a legislative, administrative or ju-
dicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed 
or elected; any person exercising a public function 
for a foreign country, including for a public agency 
or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a 
public international organisation.100 
The Commentaries on the Convention explicitly define “public 
enterprise” as 
any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over 
which a government, or governments, may directly 
or indirectly, exercise a dominant influence. This is 
deemed to be the case, inter alia, when the govern-
ment or governments hold the majority of the enter-
prise’s subscribed capital, control the majority of 
votes attaching to shares issued by the enterprise or 
can appoint a majority of the enterprise’s administra-
tive or managerial body or supervisory board.101 
As included in the OECD Convention, Congress expanded the 
definition of a foreign official to include “public international or-
ganizations.”102 However, Congress did not expand the definition to 
include employees of entities that are controlled or indirectly owned 
by a government—also included in the OECD Convention.103 De-
spite all the amendments Congress made to the FCPA, Congress did 
                                                                                                             
 99 Aguilar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 80, at 19; Nguyen Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 84, at 14. 
 100 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions, art. I, ¶ 4(a), Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter 
OECD Convention]. 
 101 Id. at Commentaries, ¶ 14. 
 102 Aguilar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 80, at 20; Nguyen Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 87, at 14. 
 103 Aguilar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 80, at 20; Nguyen Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 87, at 14. 
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not bring the FCPA into strict conformity with the Convention.104 
Because Congress had never expressly included state-operated cor-
porations as part of the FCPA, and Congress did not intend to in-
clude employees of businesses that were controlled or indirectly 
owned by a foreign government as a foreign official, Congress never 
intended to criminalize payments to state-owned corporations.105 
3. Purposive Arguments and Analysis 
The defendants in Nguyen argued that the purpose of the FCPA 
was to criminalize the payment of bribes to public officials, politi-
cians, and political parties.106 The defense argued that under the 
FCPA, an instrumentality must perform a government or public 
function, rather than a commercial one.107 The illicit payments were 
made to employees of Vietnamese entities, which included a Viet-
namese airline, an aviation industry business, and several petroleum 
industry companies.108 Consequently, the defendants urged that the 
entities employing the Vietnamese officials did not employ foreign 
officials under the FCPA because the entities were commercial and 
something more than ultimate ownership or control by the govern-
ment was required.109 To conclude otherwise would yield overbroad 
results and would not be in accordance with the purpose of the stat-
ute.110 In countries where government ownership and control is per-
vasive, such as in communist countries, a definition without a gov-
ernment function requirement would result in an entire nation pop-
ulated by “foreign officials.”111 In the United States, companies such 
as AIG, Lockheed Martin, and General Motors would be instrumen-
talities of the United States’ government—a result that would be in-
consistent with the purpose of criminalizing public bribery under the 
FCPA.112 
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 105 Aguilar Motion to Dismiss, supra note 80, at 20; Nguyen Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 87, at 14. 
 106 Nguyen Motion to Dismiss, supra note 87, at 8. 
 107 Id. at 9. 
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Ultimately, the Nguyen court denied the defendants’ motion in 
one sentence and failed to provide any analysis.113 The Carson court 
concluded that “the statutory language of the FCPA is clear, that the 
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, and the resort to the 
legislative history of the FCPA is unnecessary.”114 It also proposed 
several non-exclusive, non-dispositive factors that bear on the ques-
tion of whether a business entity is a government instrumentality: 
The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and 
its employees; [t]he foreign state’s degree of control 
over the entity; [t]he purpose of the entity’s activi-
ties; [t]he entity’s obligations and privileges under 
the foreign state’s law, including whether the entity 
exercises exclusive or controlling power to adminis-
ter its designated functions; [t]he circumstances sur-
rounding the entity’s creation; and [t]he foreign 
state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including 
the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsi-
dies, special tax treatment, and loans).115 
Similarly, the Aguilar court rejected the defendants’ argument 
and instead, posited broad characteristics held by government agen-
cies and departments that qualify as instrumentalities: (1) entity pro-
vides a service to the citizens; (2) key officers and directors of the 
entity are, or are appointed by, government officials; (3) entity is 
predominantly financed by the government fisc; (4) entity is vested 
with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its 
designated functions; and (5) entity is widely perceived to perform 
official government functions.116 
III. UNITED STATES V. ESQUENAZI 
In December 2009, Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez were 
indicted on twenty-one counts for their participation in a scheme to 
commit foreign bribery and money laundering from November 2001 
                                                                                                             
 113 Order, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009). 
 114 United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at 
*8 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011). 
 115 Id. at *3-4. 
 116 United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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through March 2005.117 Esquenazi and Rodriguez owned Terra Tel-
ecommunications, which purchased phone minutes from foreign 
vendors and then sold those minutes to customers in the United 
States; Telecommunications D’Haiti was one of Terra Telecommu-
nications’ main vendors.118 In 2001, Terra Telecommunications ex-
ecuted a contract to buy minutes directly from Telecommunications 
D’Haiti, whose Director General was Patrick Joseph (appointed by 
Haiti’s then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide) and Director of Inter-
national Relations was Robert Antoine.119 By October 2011, Terra 
Telecommunications owed Telecommunications D’Haiti over 
$400,000, so Esquenazi negotiated a deal with Antoine that pro-
vided side payments in exchange for reducing Terra Telecommuni-
cations’ debt.120 
In April 2003, following a change in management by President 
Aristide, Jean Rene Duperval succeeded to Antoine’s position. Es-
quenazi formed a shell company, Telecom Consulting Services, to 
funnel side payments to Duperval.121 The shell company’s president 
was Duperval’s sister, Margurite Grandison, and Terra Telecommu-
nications made seven payments totaling $75,000 to Telecom Con-
sulting Services.122 Esquenazi and Rodriguez pled not guilty to all 
twenty-one counts.123 
In Esquenazi’s motion to dismiss, he argued that the FCPA does 
not apply to an employee of an entity merely because the entity is 
controlled by a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign 
government or is partially owned by a foreign government.124 Es-
quenazi argued that the statute was ambiguous because it failed to 
                                                                                                             
 117 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Florida Executives, One Florida In-
termediary and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for Their Al-
leged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Dec. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-florida-executives-one-florida-intermediary-
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 118 United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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 124 Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 2, United 
States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-CR-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter 
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define an instrumentality.125 He further argued that when a statute is 
unclear, courts should use canons of statutory construction to deter-
mine Congress’ intent and give it effect.126 
Analyzing the statute’s plain text, Esquenazi reasoned that a def-
inition of the term “instrumentality” which included an entity con-
trolled or partially owned by a department, agency, or instrumental-
ity, would run afoul with the ordinary meaning and ultimate purpose 
of the statute; instead, a definition of the term “instrumentality” 
should include an element of performance of a government func-
tion.127 Because the text of the statute was less than instructive, Es-
quenazi argued that the court should look to Congress’ intent.128 
The defense contended that Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
FCPA was to criminalize corporate bribery of foreign officials, pol-
iticians, and political parties.129 By looking at the “mischief and de-
fect” the statute was meant to remedy, a definition of “instrumental-
ity” that would best give the statute the effect intended by Congress 
would be to include a concept of government function.130 The de-
fense repurposed the argument used in Nguyen, which analyzed the 
use of “instrumentality” in similar statutes such as the FSIA and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).131 Us-
ing the FSIA, the defense argued that a majority ownership by a for-
eign state is the benchmark of instrumentality status.132 Using 
ERISA, the defense argued that whether an entity is an instrumen-
tality hinges on whether the entity performs a governmental function 
rather than involving primarily private interests.133 Accordingly, the 
FSIA and ERISA characterize instrumentalities as entities that serve 
a public function.134 
Esquenazi argued that mere control by a foreign government is 
insufficient to extend the ambit of the FCPA.135 Again, repurposing 
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a Nguyen argument, the defense argued that the accounting provi-
sion included a control test for establishing liability of corporate 
owners; however, no such test existed for the establishment of an 
instrumentality, which is indicative of Congress’ intent to provide a 
control element to one portion of the statute and not to the other.136 
If Congress intended for the determination of an “instrumentality” 
to be determined by the mere existence of control, it would have 
included a control test like the one found in the accounting provi-
sion.137 
It was further argued that the FCPA was amended to conform to 
the OECD Convention, which defines a “foreign public official” as 
“any person exercising a public function for a foreign country.”138 
Congress, however, did not amend the FCPA to include application 
to employees of government-controlled enterprises.139 Congress’ 
decision not to revise the meaning of “instrumentality” while imple-
menting the Convention is indicative of Congress’ intent to require 
more than government control to establish FCPA liability.140 
Also borrowing from Nguyen, Esquenazi argued that under the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis, an “instrumentality,” which follows 
“agency” and “department” in the statute, must perform a function 
similar to functions performed by a government agency or depart-
ment.141 Unfortunately, the court disagreed with Esquenazi’s argu-
ments, and it denied his motion to dismiss.142 In its order, the court 
found that the United States successfully alleged that Antoine and 
Duperval were foreign officials of state-owned Haiti Teleco.143 
Without any substantiation or reasoning, the court concluded that it 
disagreed with Esquenazi’s contention that Haiti Teleco could not 
be an instrumentality under the FCPA’s definition of a “foreign of-
ficial” because the plain language and plain meaning of the statute 
                                                                                                             
 136 Id. at 11. 
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showed that as alleged in the indictment, Haiti Teleco could be an 
instrumentality of the Haitian government.144 
During trial, the United States successfully presented evidence 
to establish that Telecommunications D’Haiti had significant ties to 
the government of Haiti. An expert witness, Luis Gary Lissade, tes-
tified that Telecommunications D’Haiti was formed in 1968, and at 
its inception, the government appointed two members of its board 
of directors.145 The expert further testified that during the 1970s, the 
National Bank of Haiti acquired 97% ownership of Telecommuni-
cations D’Haiti, and afterwards, the Haitian President appointed all 
of its board of directors.146 In the expert’s ultimate opinion, Tele-
communications D’Haiti belonged “totally to the state” and “was 
considered . . . a public entity.”147 
A jury found Esquenazi and Rodriguez guilty on all counts.148 
Esquenazi and Rodriguez appealed their conviction to the Eleventh 
Circuit arguing that Telecommunications D’Haiti was not an instru-
mentality of the Haitian government because it did not provide tra-
ditional, core government functions and that the FCPA was uncon-
stitutionally vague.149 The central question in the appeal was 
whether Telecommunications D’Haiti was an instrumentality of the 
government of Haiti under the FCPA. The Eleventh Circuit re-
sponded in the affirmative.150 
In the first appellate decision to address the meaning of “instru-
mentality,” the Eleventh Circuit defined “instrumentality” as “an en-
tity controlled by the government of a foreign country that performs 
a function the controlling government treats as its own.”151 In terms 
of plain meaning, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the word “instru-
mentality” is subject to multiple meanings.152 As such, the court 
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 145 United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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turned to other methods of statutory construction—including nosci-
tur a sociis.153 Using the noscitur a sociis doctrine, the court gleaned 
that an instrumentality must be under the control or dominion of the 
government and must be doing the business of the government to 
qualify as an “instrumentality” under the FCPA.154 
In an examination of another portion of the FCPA, the court 
looked at the “grease payment” exception to FCPA liability.155 The 
court noted that the FCPA’s definition of “routine governmental ac-
tion” explicitly included the provision of phone service, rejecting 
Esquenazi’s and Rodriguez’s contention that a government-con-
trolled entity engaged in a commercial service cannot be an instru-
mentality under the FCPA.156 
Turning to an analysis of the 1998 amendment to the FCPA, the 
court examined the United States’ ratification of the OECD Conven-
tion and the subsequent FCPA amendment.157 The court noted that 
the OECD Convention defines a “foreign public official” as includ-
ing “any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, 
including for a . . . public enterprise” as well as to agents of “any 
public international organization.”158 However, Congress only 
added the “public international organization” component to the 
FCPA.159 To that, the court deduced that Congress must have felt 
that the pre-existing definition of a foreign official already covered 
a government-controlled enterprise.160 Any other interpretation, the 
court concluded, would find the United States in conflict with our 
treaty obligations—in contradiction of the Charming Betsy doctrine, 
which requires that federal statutes be interpreted so as to avoid con-
flict with international law.161 
The appellate court noted that a “usual” or “proper” government 
function changes over time and varies from one country to the 
next.162 To offer guidance, the court defined an “instrumentality” 
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under the FCPA as “an entity controlled by the government of a for-
eign country that performs a function the controlling government 
treats as its own.”163 The court elaborated on what constitutes “con-
trol” with five factors to consider: 
[1] the foreign government’s formal designation of 
that entity; [2] whether the government has a major-
ity interest in the entity; [3] the government’s ability 
to hire and fire the entity’s principals; [4] the extent 
to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly into 
the government’s fisc, and, by the same token, the 
extent to which the government funds the entity if it 
fails to break even; [5] the length of time these indi-
cia have existed.164 
The court also elaborated as to what constitutes “a function the 
controlling government treats as its own” with four factors to con-
sider: 
[1] whether the entity has a monopoly over the func-
tion it exists to carry out; [2] whether the government 
subsidizes the costs associated with the entity provid-
ing services; [3] whether the entity provides services 
to the public at large in the foreign country; [4] and 
whether the public and the government of that for-
eign country generally perceive the entity to be per-
forming a government function.165 
Both sets of factors are not meant to be exhaustive, but are to be 
considered by the courts when engaging in a fact-based inquiry.166 
Esquenazi and Rodriguez appealed the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion to the Supreme Court.167 The Supreme Court denied Esquenazi 
and Rodriguez’s petition.168 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision will 
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have a significant impact on how business is transacted around the 
world and with businesses that have varying degrees of governmen-
tal control. All in all, the court proposed nine factors to be consid-
ered and weighed. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Eleventh Circuit in Esquenazi stepped up to the challenge 
of clarifying the “foreign official” element of the FCPA: is a state-
owned enterprise an instrumentality for the purpose of delineating 
the scope of the statute? Unfortunately, the court fell into a trap that 
lower courts have fallen into. Rather than dealing with the issue of 
whether a state-owned enterprise constitutes an “instrumentality” 
head on, the court dwelled on the fact that the determination is an 
issue of fact. In its opinion, the court propounded a multi-factor test. 
Actually, as if the issue were not sufficiently complicated, it pro-
pounded two multi-factor tests. One was to determine if the foreign 
government exerted control over the entity. The other was to deter-
mine if the entity provided a function that the foreign government 
treated as its own. All in all, the court propounded nine non-dispos-
itive factors and zero guidance on how the factors should be applied. 
Although Esquenazi was a major victory for the DOJ, this total-
ity of the circumstances approach further muddles the issue. Es-
quenazi has also broadened the scope greatly—even beyond what 
the enacting Congress intended. The broadened scope is critically 
important because it affects businesses and individuals that engage 
in international commerce. However, the case provides little guid-
ance to the business community, failing to provide any notice as to 
when their interaction with a state-owned entity would run afoul of 
the FCPA. As a result, businesses and individuals transacting busi-
ness in the international arena must curtail their legitimate business 
activities or implement extreme prophylactic measures in an overa-
bundance of caution to inoculate themselves against FCPA liability. 
A. Broadened Scope 
In interpreting a statute, courts should start with the text of a 
statute and ask what the text would mean to an ordinary speaker of 
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the language.169  The use of textual sources to aid in the discernment 
of a word’s ordinary meaning is admissible and includes dictionar-
ies, grammar books, surveys of linguistic practice, and the inter-
preter’s own sense of ordinary usage.170 Using dictionaries as tools, 
the court analyzed Black’s Law Dictionary171 and Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary.172 However, the court ultimately con-
cluded that the dictionary definitions did not provide a complete an-
swer.173 As a matter of fact, the court had previously acknowledged 
that “instrumentality” was susceptible to multiple meanings.174 
The court then turned to the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory 
construction. Under this canon of statutory construction, when 
words are grouped together and ordinarily have similar meanings, 
then general words are limited and qualified by the special words in 
the group.175 The FCPA prohibits any payments to an “officer or 
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or 
instrumentality thereof . . . .”176 Here, using noscitur a sociis, “de-
partment” and “agency” are the special words, and “instrumentality” 
is the general word. It is highly likely that Congress intended for 
instrumentalities to consist of entities more similar to regulatory 
bodies, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or entities 
that provide unique governmental functions, like the Department of 
the Treasury. By extension, Congress likely intended for instrumen-
talities to include independent entities with a body of governance, 
like the National Labor Review Board. 
                                                                                                             
 169 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
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Instead, in its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit determined that be-
cause departments and agencies are under the control of the govern-
ment and conduct the business of the government, then an instru-
mentality must likewise be under the control or dominion of the gov-
ernment and engage in the business of the government to be an in-
strumentality under the FCPA.177 The court’s superficial analysis 
lends itself to a number of similar, and equally as faulty, conclu-
sions. The court did not quantify how much control or what func-
tions were necessary to constitute an “instrumentality.” The nine 
factors promoted by the court do not offer any guidance. 
In furthering its analysis, the court analyzed the grease payment 
provision, which specifically provides for the inclusion of phone 
service as a “routine governmental action.”178 Using this provision, 
the court rejected the defendants’ contention that a government-con-
trolled entity that provides a commercial service cannot automati-
cally be an instrumentality. The court’s conclusion ignores the fact 
that Congress may have intended for there to be a threshold for the 
inclusion of an enterprise as an instrumentality. Would Congress 
have included a phone service provider that is 1% owned by the 
government? It would certainly be government-controlled and 
would be carrying on in the business of the government. What about 
10% or 51% share of control by the government? 
Further, the court declined to engage in an analysis under the 
ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, explaining that the 
canon does not apply when the term at issue is not a general term 
following a list of specific items. 179 The court relied on the fact that 
the word preceding “instrumentality” is “any” rather than “other,” 
which, in its opinion, does not make the term a generalized catchall. 
The court’s reliance is flawed. In its explanation, the court com-
pares the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) to that of 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B). In both statutes, the word “any” pre-
cedes the word “instrumentality.” While the word “other” also pre-
cedes the word instrumentality in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B), and not 
in the FCPA provision in question, the reasoning for not giving due 
consideration to the doctrine of ejusdem generis is baseless. Had 
ejusdem generis been considered, the court would have come to the 
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conclusion that “instrumentality” embraces the same entities as 
those in a “department” or “agency.” 
The court proceeded to engage in an analysis of the legislative 
history. Curiously, however, the court begins its analysis with the 
1998 amendment to the FCPA. It completely disregarded the legis-
lative history of the FCPA’s enactment, which is quite instructive. 
In 1977, after several years of investigations and hearings, Con-
gress passed the FCPA and enacted a statute that prohibited corrupt 
payments to public officials overseas. Prior to that, some of the bills 
introduced before the enactment of the FCPA explicitly included 
state-owned enterprises under the ambit of the FCPA. Two bills in 
particular defined “foreign government” to include “a corporation 
or other legal entity established or owned by, and subject to control 
by, a foreign government.”180 Later, in June 1977, a bill was intro-
duced in the House, and it defined “foreign government” to include 
“a corporation or other legal entity established, owned, or subject to 
managerial control by a foreign government.”181 From the bills that 
were proposed, it is evident that Congress was aware of the exist-
ence of government-controlled enterprises and their possible role in 
foreign corruption; however, Congress did not act. 
In 1998, in an effort to conform the FCPA to the OECD Con-
vention, Congress passed an amendment to the FCPA. Unfortu-
nately, Congress fell short yet again. Although it is relatively well 
known that subsequent legislative history is less authoritative than 
committee reports and rejected bills, the Eleventh Circuit relied al-
most exclusively on the 1998 Amendment. The OECD Convention 
defines a “foreign public official” as “any person holding a legisla-
tive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether 
appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a 
foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; 
and any official or agent of a public organisation . . . .”182 
In the 1998 Amendment, Congress amended the FCPA to in-
clude the “public organisation” component of the OECD Conven-
tion, making it explicitly clear that public organizations were within 
the scope of the statute. However, it would be a gross overstatement 
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to say that the 1998 amendment brought the FCPA into strict con-
formance with the OECD Convention. The OECD Convention is 
not a self-executing treaty, as it requires legislative action to be 
given effect in the United States. If it was Congress’ intent to include 
government-owned enterprises under the ambit of the FCPA, it 
should have explicitly included such language into the amendment 
as it did for international public organizations. Congress had the op-
portunity to do so in 1977 and again in 1998. To assume and draw 
inferences where there are none takes away from intent of the enact-
ing Congress. 
The court also failed to look to other statutes where the word 
“instrumentality” was used for guidance. Had the court looked to 
statutes such as the FSIA, 183 it would have applied a narrower inter-
pretation than what it established. Enacted one year before the 
FCPA, the FSIA defines “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state” as an entity that is “a separate legal person or otherwise” and 
“which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned 
by a foreign or political subdivision thereof.”184 
The court had an opportunity to properly quash the issue by es-
tablishing a bright-line rule, which would require a certain percent-
age of ownership or control, or, in the alternative, refuse to apply the 
government’s argument absent the clear language present in the 
OECD Convention. This is particularly so given the judicial vacuum 
that exists by the very nature of the FCPA’s enforcement. Under the 
court’s interpretation, just about any circumstance would allow for 
a foreign government to control and treat any commercial enterprise 
as its own; any percentage of governmental ownership would bring 
a state-owned entity under the ambit of the FCPA. 
Given the doctrines of statutory construction and the legislative 
history of the FCPA, it is evident that the Eleventh Circuit has ex-
panded the scope of the statute beyond its intended basis. Absent 
any evidence or support that Congress intended to include govern-
ment-controlled enterprises, the courts should err on the side of cau-
tion and interpret the statute narrowly. The factors proffered by the 
                                                                                                             
 183 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2012). 
 184 Id. § 1603(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
414 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:2 
 
Eleventh Circuit are of little assistance as they do not help the indi-
viduals and businesses engaging in international trade gauge their 
risk in transactions. Using the court’s factors and analysis, it is hard 
to think of an enterprise that a foreign government is involved with 
that would not fall under the scope of the FCPA as interpreted by 
the Eleventh Circuit. 
B. Effects of Ambiguity 
We are living in an increasingly globalized world. The Internet 
has greatly expanded the possibility of engaging in business be-
tween nations and continents. To that end, however, the FCPA has 
created an unbearable level of uncertainty for individuals and busi-
nesses transacting business overseas. Leaving aside the possible due 
process violations, attempting to abide by the unknown restrictions 
of the FCPA has led to parties conducting business in an overabun-
dance of caution to avoid prosecution. Esquenazi has done little to 
ameliorate the ambiguity of the FCPA. In fact, the court’s interpre-
tation of the statute has greatly expanded the scope of the statute and 
will likely lead to an increase in prosecution—all with little guid-
ance for individuals and businesses. 
Many individuals and businesses have implemented anti-corrup-
tion programs to thwart the effects of the broadly interpreted statute. 
However, an effective anti-corruption program does not come with-
out significant costs. In a survey of 358 American and English com-
panies, it was reported that 80% of U.S. companies have banned fa-
cilitating payments entirely.185 Twenty-three percent of U.S. com-
panies said that they made the decision to walk away from doing 
business in a country perceived to have a high rate of local corrup-
tion.186 An effective anti-corruption program can be the difference 
between a fine and an aggressive prosecution. A growing number of 
multinational companies have established anti-corruption programs 
that have led to leverage when plea-bargaining. It is important to 
note that it is not enough to simply have an anti-corruption pro-
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gram—a compliance culture must permeate the organization in or-
der to effectively demonstrate to the DOJ its commitment to com-
pliance. 
An effective anti-corruption program consists of various com-
ponents. The first of which is a clear anti-corruption policy. The or-
ganization must have written standards and procedures to identify 
and prevent acts that violate the FCPA.187 This usually includes a 
code of conduct as well as oversight from high-level personnel. To 
be successful, management must be committed to compliance. 
Risk assessments are another vital component of an anti-corrup-
tion program. Assessments help companies determine whether they 
have adequate compliance measures in place.188 A risk assessment 
allows a company to evaluate the compliance roles and activities of 
directors, officers, and audit staff.189 The assessment also reviews 
international operations, contracts, hiring/employment practices, 
and due diligence in mergers and/or acquisitions.190 
Hiring and employment practices are essential to promoting 
compliance within the organization. Training of employees allows 
the compliance program to infiltrate every layer of the organization, 
making everyone aware of general ethics regulations. For those who 
interact frequently with foreign officials, comprehensive training 
pertaining to facilitating-payment exceptions is undertaken to de-
bunk common myths. Additionally, confidential reporting removes 
barriers that may exist in alerting upper management of possible 
FCPA violations. Providing incentives for whistleblowing encour-
ages employees to approach upper management or, if it exists, an 
independent anti-corruption board committee. 
One of the greatest risks companies face arises when merging 
with or acquiring another company. Successor liability removes the 
defense that the acquiring company does not assume the past sins of 
the newly acquired company.191 Due diligence is pivotal in reducing 
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the risk of prosecution under the FCPA subsequent to a merger or 
acquisition. Among other things, the acquiring company should re-
view documents and files of the target company in search of con-
tracts with foreign governments, “gifts,” and lapses in internal con-
trols.192 If at all possible, the acquiring company should obtain an 
indemnification agreement to limit its liability after the acquisition. 
If FCPA issues are revealed during the acquiring company’s due 
diligence, it is important to establish a compliance program for the 
newly acquired company at the outset. 
In the event of a serious corruption charge, companies may ini-
tiate an internal investigation. If the allegation is sufficiently egre-
gious, a company’s management may choose to hire outside counsel 
to conduct its internal investigation or represent the company in a 
DOJ investigation.193 The decision to conduct its own investigation 
versus using outside counsel depends on the seriousness of the alle-
gation, level of FCPA experience required, financial resources, or 
who is involved. 
How much does compliance cost? In 2013, Wal-Mart reported 
that it had spent $73 million on FCPA-related expenses during the 
first quarter.194 During the previous fiscal year, Wal-Mart had spent 
$157 million dollars on FCPA matters.195 In the midst of an FCPA 
investigation resulting from self-disclosure, Avon reportedly spent 
$280 million on FCPA compliance.196 These figures do not include 
subsequent criminal or civil fines. In 2014, Alcoa World Alumina 
LLC pled guilty to one count of violating the FCPA and agreed to 
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pay $384 million in criminal and civil fines as well as profit dis-
gorgement to the SEC and DOJ.197 In 2011, engineering firm Kel-
logg Brown & Root LLC (KBR) plead guilty to four substantive 
counts of violating the FCPA and agreed to pay a $402 million pen-
alty.198 
All in all, the cost of enforcement is quite exorbitant. Sadly, it is 
required to safely engage in business overseas. Given the costs, it is 
very unfair to have individuals and businesses take on the expense 
of a robust compliance program to err on the side of caution simply 
because the businesses cannot discern what a “foreign official” is 
within the nine factors propounded by the Eleventh Circuit. When 
taken in conjunction with the fact that companies are choosing to 
abstain from doing business in certain countries, it is an unbearable 
cost for individuals and businesses. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Without a doubt, the FCPA’s definition of a foreign official is 
ambiguous. Because the statute is criminal in nature and has the au-
thority to implement lengthy prison sentences, it should be narrowly 
construed. The Eleventh Circuit had the opportunity to clarify the 
inherent ambiguity. However, it failed to do so. On the contrary, it 
magnified the ambiguity with a number of factors to consider—none 
of which are dispositive. 
The Supreme Court has declined to hear Esquenazi’s or Rodri-
guez’s appeal. The proper scope of the FCPA remains unclear. The 
only option that remains is legislative action. Individuals and com-
panies simply cannot operate in a state of uncertainty given the pro-
spect of imprisonment or fines. 
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